Perspectives on PPP and Long-Run Real Exchange Rates by Kenneth A. Froot & Kenneth Rogoff
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES




Working Paper No. 4952




Prepared for Handbook of InternationalEconomics, Volume 3, Gene Grossman and Kenneth
Rogoff (eds.): (Amsterdam: North HollandPress). The authors are grateful to Marianne Baxter,
José DeGregorio, Rudiger Dornbusch, HallEdison, Jeffrey Frankel, Gene Grossman, Karen Lewis and Julio Rotemberg for helpfulcomments, and to Michael Kim and Paul O'Connell for research
assistance. This paper is part of NBER'sresearch programs in International Finance and
Macroeconomics and International Trade andInvestment. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the NationalBureau of Economic Research.
) 1994 by Kenneth A. Froot and KennethRogoff. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to thesource.NBER Working Paper #4952
December 1994
PERSPECTIVES ON PPP AND
LONG-RUN REAL EXCHANGE RATES
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the large and growing literaturewhich tests PPP and other models of
the long-run real exchange rate. We distinguish threedifferent stages of PPP testing and focus
on what has been learned from each. The most important overalllesson has been that the real
exchange rate appears stationary over sufficiently long horizons.Simple, univariate random walk
specifications can be rejected in favor of stationary alternatives.However, we argue that
multjvaj-ja tests, which ask whetherany linear combination of prices and exchange rates are
stationary, have not necessarily provided meaningfulrejections of nonstationarity. We also
review a number of other theories of thelong run real exchange rate --includingthe Balassa
Sarnuelson hypothesis --aswell as the evidence supporting them. Weargue that the persistence
of real exchange rate movements can begenerated by a number of sensible models and that
Balassa-Samuelson effects seem important, but mainly forcountries with widely disparate levels
of income of growth. Finally, thispaper presents new evidence testing the law of one price on
200 years of historical commodity price data forEngland and France, and uses a century of data
from Argentina to test the possibility ofsample-selection bias in tests of long-nm PPP.
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This paper overviews what, we know—andwhat we don't knowabout the
long-run determinants of purchasingpower parity. A decade ago, when the papers
for the first edition of the Handbook of InternationalEconomics were written. PPP
seemed like a fairly dull research topic. On theone hand, the advent of floating
exchange rates made it obvious to even the most stubborn defenders ofpurchasing
power parity that PPP is not a short-run relationship; price level movements do
not begin to offset exchange rate swingson a monthly or even annual basis. On
the other hand, there were neither sufficienttime spans of floating rate data nor
adequate econometric techniques for testing thevalidity of PPP as a long-run
relationship. Fortunately, the past decade has witnesseda tremendous degree of
progress in the area and, in spite of some mis-steps and researchtangents. several
important results have emerged.
First, a broad body of evidencesuggests that the real exchange rate is not a
random walk, and that shocks to the realexchange rate damp out over time, albeit
very slowly. Consensus estimates put the half-life of deviations from PPPat about
4 years for exchange ratesamong major industrialized countries. Second, there is
some evidence that real exchange rates tend to behigher in rich countries than in
poor countries, and that relatively fast-growing countriesexperience real-exchange
rate appreciations. But the empirical evidence in favorof a 'Balassa-Samuelson'
2effect is weaker than commonlybelieved, especially when comparing realexchange rates across industrialized countriesover the post-Bretton-Woods period.
Section 2 of thepaper reviews the huge time series literaturetesting sim- ple PPP. This area hasproven fruitful ground for applying modern methods for
dealing with nonstationary andnear-nonstationary time series. Our organization
traces out the evolution of the literature, fromnaive static tests of PPP, to modern
unit-root approaches to testing whetherthe real exchange rate isstationary, to
cointegration techniques, the most recentphase of PPP testing. As we shallsee,
cointegration approaches have sometimes createdas much confusion as clarity on the issue of PPP. Itappears that this approach is plagued by small-sample bias
when applied to floatingexchange rates, often yielding nonsensical results.
Because convergence to PPP isrelatively slow, it is not easy to empirically
distinguish between a random-walk realexchange rate and a stationary real ex-
change rate that reverts very slowly. This isparticularly problematic when looking
at highly volatile floating exchangerates, where the noise can easily mask slow
convergence toward long-run equilibrium. One of the major innovationshas been to look at longer historical datasets, incorporating fixed as well as floating rate
periods. There are some obvious problems inmixing regimes, though these have been addressed to some extent in theliterature. One issue that has not been
looked at in the literature is theproblem of survivorship bias, which we discuss in section 2.3.6.
In section 2.5 we discuss researchon more disaggregated price data, including
a nearly two-hundred year data set oncommodity prices in England and France
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Asidefrom providing an ex-
tremely long data set, this historical data offerssome perspective on the behavior
of cross-country relative prices inmore modern times..
In section 3 of thepaper, we look at some possible medium- to long-run deter-
minants of the real exchange,particularly the supply-side determinants empha-
sized in the popular Balassa-Samuelsonmodel. We also consider some evidence
that positive demand shocks, suchas unexpected increases in government spend-
ing, lead to a medium-run appreciations of the realexchange rate. Finally, we
consider 'pricing-to-market' theories. Theconclusions offer some possible direc-
tions for future research.
32. Evolving Tests of Simple PPP
In this section, we examine simple PPP —Cassel's(1922) notion that exchange
rates should tend to equalize relative price levels in different countries.1 While
this notion appears simple enough, many subtleties arise in trying to implement it.
In subsection 2.1, we begin by briefly reviewing the basic motivation underlying
PPP and some alternative definitions. Following that, we turn in the next three
subsections to the very large recent literature on testing for PPP. We distinguish
three different stages of PPP tests:
1. older tests in which the null hypothesis is that PPP holds (section 2.2)
2. more recent theories and time series tests in which the null hypothesis is
that PPP are completely permanent (section 2.3); and
3. even more recent cointegration tests in which the null hypothesis is that
deviations away from any linear combination of prices and exchanges rates
is permanent (section 2.4).
We show how each stage reflects reactions to prior empirical resultsas well as
to advances in theoretical modeling and econometric technique. Finally, in section
2.5, we consider tests based on more disaggregated price data.
2.1. Definitions and Basic Concepts
The starting point for most derivations of PPP is the lawof one price, which
states that for any good i,
pt(i) =p'(i)+ t (2.1)
where pt(i) is the log of the time-I domestic-currency price ofgood i, p'(i) is the
analogous foreign-currency price, and Stisthe log of the time-t domestic-currency
price of foreign exchange. The premise underlying the law of one price isa simple
goods-market arbitrage argument: abstracting from tariffs and transportation
costs, unfettered trade in goods should ensure identical prices across countries. In
practice, the 'law' of one price holds mainly in the breech, as we shall latersee.
Still, it provides a very useful reference point.
tSee Dornbusch(1987) for a thoroughhistorical treatment of the PPP doctrine.
4If the law of price holds for every individual good, then it follows immediately
that it must hold for any identical basket of goods.2 Most empiricaltests, however.
do not attempt to compare identical baskets, but use different countries' CPIs and
WPIs instead. In general, these have weights and mixes of goods thatvary across
countries. (In principle, it is possible to construct internationalprice indices
for identical baskets of goods and, starting in the l950s, there have beena few
attempts to do so. These culminate in the influential work of Summers and Heston
(1991), discussed later in section 3.)
Absolute consumption-based PPP requires:
p(CPI) =p(CPI)+ s (2.2)
where CPI denotes the basket of goods used in forming theconsumer price index.
Clearly, even if the law of one price holds, there is no reason why condition (2.2)
should hold, unless the two countries have identical consumption baskets. In order
to allow for a constant price differential between baskets, the bulk of the empirical
literature focuses on testing relative consumption-based PPP:
pt(CPI) =p(CPI)+ St (2.3)
which requires that changes in relative price levels be offset by changes in the
exchange rate. Indeed, much of the post World War I debate over re-establishing
pre-war parities, which provided the genesis of PPP theory, implicitly referred to
relative PPP. Of course, among low inflation economies, there is little more reason
to believe that (2.3) will hold than (2.2), since real shocks can lead to changes in
the relative prices of different goods baskets. Across countries withvery different
inflation rates, however, one might expect condition (2.3) to hold even when (2.2)
does not.
Indeed, much of economists' faith in PP P derives from a belief that over most of
the past century, price level movements have been dominated by monetary factors.
If price index movements are dominated by monetary shocks, and ifmoney is
neutral in the long run, then it won't matter if the two baskets being compared
are not the same; relative PPP should still hold (approximately). Of course,
economists like to use PPP as a frame of reference not just for hyperinflationary
economies, but for any pair of economies. Most of this section will be concerned
with straightforward tests of PPP, but later in section 3 we shall consider various
2Even if the law of one price fails for individual goods, it is possible that thedeviations
roughlycancel out when averaged across a basket of goods.
5adjustments that have been proposed to try to give PPP more meaning for low-
inflation economies.
2.2. Stage one: Simple Purchasing Power Parity as the Null Hypothesis
In Cassel's (1922) view, PPP was seen as a central tendency of theexchange rate.
subject to temporary offset, and not a continuously-holding equivalence. Much of
the work on PPP through the l970s [see Officer's classic(1976a) survey] recognizes
the importance of temporary disturbances to PPP, inprinciple. But early formal
empirical analyses were limited by the absence of statistical and theoretical tools
for distinguishing between short-run and long-run real effects.Thus, typically, the
early studies at best only allowed for a disturbance term, and did not specifically
allow for any dynamics of adjustment to PPP.
Without doubt, the most positive results instage-one tests came from data on
high inflation economies. Frenkel (1978) ran regressions of the form
(2.4)
for a number of hyperinflationary economies. Hewas not so much interested in the
properties of the error term, as in whether the slope coefficient wasone. Frenkel
indeed found estimates of /9quiteclose to one and, based on these estimates.
argued that PPP should be an important building block ofany model of exchange
rate determination.
Outside of hyperinflations, however, moststage-one tests produced strong re-
jections of PPP. (Today, of course, it is well known thatstationarity of the resid-
uals in eq. (2.4) is required for standardhypothesis testing, a condition that will
fail if some types of shocks to the realexchange rate are permanent.) Frenkel
(1981) reports that PPP performed poorly for industrialized countriesduring the
l970s, with /3 estimates typically far from one (somecountry-pairs actually yield
negative coefficients while for others /3estimatesexceeded 2.0). Frenkel suggested
that the failure of PPP might be attributableto some combination of temporary
real shocks and sticky goods prices,implicitly arguing that PPP still holds in the
long run even though short-run factors get in theway of finding /91. However,
Frenkel made no attempt to model the short-run biasin the coefficients.
Aside from failing to allow for dynamicadjustment, another obvious problem
with eq. (2.4) is that exchange rates andprices are simultaneously determined.
and there is no compellingreason to put exchange rates on the left-hand side,
rather than visa-versa. Indeed,many authors [e.g., Isard (1977) and Giovannini
(1988)] ran the reverse regression, projecting relativeprices on the exchange rate.
6Krugman (1978) was an attempt to explicitly address the endogeneity prob-
lem [see also Frenkel (1981).] Krugman offered a flex-price model which had the
domestic monetary authorities offsetting the effects of real shocks by expanding
the money supply and thereby raising the price level. Krugman showed that in
this case the endogeneity of the price level introduces a downward bias in OLS
estimates of /3 in eq. (2.4). To control for this bias, Krugman (1978) and Frenkel
(1981) re-estimated the equation using instrumental variables.3 Their methodol-
ogy succeeded in that it yielded coefficients closer to one than under OLS, though
one could still soundly reject purchasing power parity. The endogeneity issue can,
of course, also be cast as a left-out regressor problem. That is, the bias in the key
coefficient /3 can be removed by conditioning the regression on the realexogenous
factors that affect both exchange rates and prices and which, according to some
model, explain deviations from PPP. We will look at some of these factors later
in section 3.
A fundamental flaw in the econometrics of stage-one tests was the failure to
take explicitly into account the possible nonstationarity of relative prices and
exchange rates. Today it is well known that if there is a unit root in the error
term to eq. (2.4), then standard hypothesis tests of the proposition /3 =Iare
invalid. Both the stage-two and stage-three tests we consider next are explicitly
designed to deal with this problem. Overall, the main lesson from stage-one tests
was that PPP does not hold continuously, but the results provided no perspective
on whether PPP might be valid as a long-run proposition.
2.3.StageTwo: The Real Exchange Rate as a Random Walk
Stage-one tests' disappointing results and flawed hypothesis testing led to an al-
ternative approach. In stage-two tests, the null hypothesis becomes that the real
exchange rate follows a random walk, with the alternative hypothesis being that
PPP holds in the long run. These tests stand those from stage-one tests on their
head: they impose —rather than estimate— the hypothesis that J3 =1,and test
—rather than impose— the hypothesis that the (log of the) real exchange rate
qtEst—pt+p (2.5)
is stationary. Examples of early stage-two tests include Darby (1983), Adler and
Lehman (1983), Hakkio (1984), Frankel (1986), Edison (1987), Huizinga (1987)
3Krugnian (1978) used a time trend as an instrument, whereas Frenkel (1981)useda time
polynomial as well as lagged exchange rates and price levels.
7arid Meese and Rogoff (1988). As we shall see, the main problem with stage-two
tests is low power. Given the phenomenal volatility of floating exchange rates.
it can be very hard to distinguish between slow mean reversion and a random
walk real exchange rate, especially if one relies only on post-Bretton-Woods data.
Much of the evolution of stage-two testing has revolved around finding longer or
broader data sets, and implementing more powerful unit roots tests.
Leaving aside the problem of low power, how plausible is the null that the real
exchange rate follows a random walk? Roll (1979) argued that a random walk
is a sensible null hypothesis because real exchange-rate changes, like changes in
asset prices, should not be predictable if foreign exchange markets are efficient.
Of course, this analogy is inappropriate, since real exchange rates are not traded
assets and therefore not subject to the usual efficient capital markets logic. In-
deed, there is no reason why even the nominal exchange rate —whichis a market
variable —shouldfollow a random walk in the presence of nominal interest dif-
ferentials or risk prernia.
Certainly it is possible to find rationales for random walk, or near random
walk, exchange rate behavior that are more defensible than Roll's. In section 3
below, we will discuss the Balassa-Samuelson model, in which cross-country sec-
toral differences in productivity growth can lead to lead to real CPJ exchange rate
changes. If productivity differential shocks are permanent, sectoral productivity
shocks can induce a unit root in the real exchange rate. We also discuss Rogoff's
(1992) model, in which intertemporal smoothing of traded goods consumption
can lead to smoothing of the intratemporal price of traded and nontraded goods.
This in turn implies a unit root in the real exchange rate, even when productivity
shocks are temporary. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1994) offer a model in which any
shock (even a temporary one) that effects a wealth transfer across countries will
lead to a potentially long-lasting change in relative work effort, and therefore the
real exchange rate.4 Space considerations prevent us from presenting these and
other related rationales for random walk real exchange rates inany detail. For
our purposes here, though, it is enough to note that there are a variety of simple
yet reasonable models that can generate highly persistent deviations from PPP.
4There is a substantial empirical literature on the effects of wealth re-distributions on the
long-run equilibrium exchange rate; see for example, Krugman (1990), and Bayoumi, Clark.
Symansky and Taylor (1994). For further discussion of the effects of wealth transfers on the
long-run equilibrium exchange rate, see Baxter's, and Obstfeld and Rogoff's chapters in this
handbook.
82.3.1. Econometric Techniques to Test for Random Walk Real Exchange
Rates
Once the null hypothesis posits that the real exchange rate follows a random walk
(or more generally has a 'unit root' component5), it becomes necessary to negotiate
a number of important econometric subtleties. Most importantly, conventional
confidence intervals calculated under the null of a stationary real exchange rate
are no longer appropriate and, as Dickey and Fuller (1979) emphasized, the correct
confidence intervals should be wider.
The modern literature uses three main techniques for distinguishing the real
exchange rate from a random walk.6. The first, and most commonly used, is the
Dickey-Fuller and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. These involve a regression of
the real exchange rate, qj, on a constant, a time trend, qti,andlagged changes
in Vt_i:
qj =a0+ a1t + cr2qt_l + (L)qt_i + (2.6)
where L is the lag operator, I(L) is a p-th order polynomial in L, with coeffi-
cients i, ,, ande is white noise. Under the null hypothesis that q has a
unit root, a2 =1.Under the alternative hypothesis that PPP holds in the long
run, a =0and a2 < 1. The distribution of the OLS estimates for eq. (2.6) is
nonstandard under the random walk null, with the appropriate confidence inter-
vals reported by Dickey and Fuller (1979). An example of a study applying the
Dickey-Fuller test to floating real exchange rates is Meese-Rogoff (1988), who arc
unable to reject the unit root hypothesis for monthly dollar/pound, dollar/yen,
and dollar/DM floating exchange rate data.
Eq. (2.6) can also be used to calculate Phillips (1987) Z test, which allows for
conditional heteroskedasticity of the residual. Perron (1989) extends these tests
to allow for one-time changes in the constant and the trend by including dummy
51f the real exchange rate has one unit root, then its first difference must be stationary though
not necessarily serially uncorrelated as in the random walk model.
6See also Breuer (1994) for an excellent survey of econometric problems in testing for unit
roots in real exchange rates. Some of the very early efforts to test the random walk real exchange
rate hypothesis, including Darby (1983), and Adler and Lehman (1983), did rot use modern
root testing methodologies, but nevertheless illustrated the difficulties in rejecting the random
walk model.
7Some of the studies below test only a2 <1,and do not jointly apply the restriction a0 =0.
Also, many studies look only at the straight Dickey-Fuller test and do not augment the regression
with the lagged changes. There is no problem with this simplification as long as the residuals
are not autocorrelated.
9variables. However, in introducing break points, data snooping biases can make
the resulting test statistics difficult to interpret [see Christiano (1992)).
The second commonly-used technique is that of variance ratios. The idea
here is that under the null hypothesis of a random walk, the variance of the real







should be one for all i. For a stationary series, on the other hand, the k statistic
converges to zero as k increases.8
A third technique is that of fractional integration, which encompasses a broader
class of stationary processes under the alternative hypothesis. A fractionally in-
tegrated process allows the real exchange rate to evolve according to:
—L)dqj=x(L)et, (2.8)
where (L) and (L) are polynomial lag operators with roots outside the unit
circle and Etiswhite noise. If the parameter d =0,then the real exchange rate is
confined to the class of stationary ARMA processes described by (L) and (L).
If d =1and I(L) =x(L)=1,thenthe real exchange rate follows a random
walk. The advantage of this class of processes is that it allows for fractional
integration, 0 < d < 1. Because fractionally integrated processes are stationary.
but have autocovarjance functions that die off more slowly than ARMAprocesses.
encompassing them under the alternative hypothesis may enhance one's chances
of rejecting the random walk null. See Diebold, Husted and Rush (1991) for
citations and a discussion of estimation techniques.
2.3.2. Results for Post-Bretton-Woods Data
The basic result in the empirical literature is that if one applies unit roots tests to
bilateral industrialized-country monthly data, it is difficult to reject the null ofa
unit root for currencies that float against each other. See, for example, Meese and
Rogoff (1988) or Mark (1990). An exception is Huizinga (1987), who constructed
variance ratios to argue in favor of positive autocorrelation in U.S. dollar real
exchange rates for horizons under two years. However, Huizinga's results may be
8Poterba and Summers (1986) show that the variance ratio is a function of theprocesses
autocorrelat ion coefficients I through i.
10attributable to the long, large swings in the dollar between the mid-1970s and
mid- 1980s.
For currency pairs that are fixed (or formally stabilized), the evidence is more
mixed. In Mark's (1990) tests for the 1973-1988 period, the intra-European ex-
change rates come closest to rejecting a random walk, although it is only for the
Belgium/Germany currency pair that a random walk can be rejected at the 5%
confidence level. Chowdhury and Sdogati (1993) look at the 1979-1990 period,
during which time the EMS was in place. They strongly reject the random walk
for bilateral rates of various European currencies against the Deutsche mark, but
not for European exchange rates against the U.S. dollar. The apparent system-
atic differences in the behavior of the real exchange rate for various floating versus
fixed exchange rates has been noted and explored by a number of authors (see.
for example, Mussa (1986) and the Frankel and Rose chapter in this Handbook).
2.3.3. Power against persistent alternatives
The major concern with the early stage-two tests of the random walk hypothesis
is that they lack sufficient power to reject. Because slow, albeit positive, rates
of reversion toward PPP are plausible in many models, random walk tests may
provide little information against relevant alternative hypotheses.
To see how important the issue of power is, and to gain a sense of how much
data is needed to reject plausible alternatives, it is useful to calibrate a simple
autoregression, as done by Frankel (1986, 1990). The results of this analysis show
that the post-Bretton-Woods sample period is far too short to reliably reject the
random walk hypothesis.
Suppose that PPP indeed holds over the long run, and that deviations from
PPP follow an AR(1) process (on monthly data), with serial correlation coefficient
p and error variance cr2. That is
qt—=p(q_i-—)-1-e (2.9)
where 0 p < 1,is the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate and Eisa white
noise error term with variance c.2.Supposethat the autoregression is run on a
panel data set with T observations and N independent bilateral exchange rates,
each governed by the same stochastic process.
In these circumstances, the variance of the OLS estimate of p is given by9
var( —p)c.2/[NT.var(q — (2.10)
9This example assumes for simplicity that the mean of the log real exchange rate, ,isknown.






How many years of data does expression (2.11) imply one needs to be able to
reject the random walk process when the real exchange rate is governed by the
stationary process (2.9)? Suppose for a moment that the true half-life of PPP
deviations is 36 months (3 years). This translates into a true value of the AR
coefficient in monthly data of p =0.981=
Assuming18 years of data (T =216)on a single exchange rate (N =1),eq.
(2.11) implies that the standard error of the OLS estimate of p is approximately
0.0132 =[(1
—O.9812)/216].With this degree of imprecision, the true value of
p (=0.981)is only approximately 1.44 [=(1
—0.981)10.0132)]standard errors
away from one. Thus 18 years of data are not likely to be sufficient for rejecting
the random walk null —andthis calculation uses conventional stationary real
exchange rate standard errors, rather than Dickey-Fuller standard errors.
How many years of data would it take to reject p =1at a 5% confidence
interval for a single currency using the large-sample Dickey-Fuller critical value
of 2.89? Solving the condition
2.892 =T(1—p)2/(l
—p2)
implies T =864months, or 72 years! Obviously, with a longer half life (i.e.,
a larger value of p), even more data would be required. Indeed, the preceding
calculation understates the problem, since we have employed asymptotic standard
errors in making these calculations.
Two approaches to dealing with the power problem have been tried in the
literature; one is to look at a number of currencies simultaneously (allow for
N> 1), and the other is to look at long-horizon data sets encompassing bothpre-
and post-Bretton-Woods data."
Estimation of the mean can induce finite sample bias in the estimated autoregressive coefficient.
but this nuance is not central to our example here.
'°Note that by using the asymptotic standard error, we avoid small sample problems which
introduce non-normality into the distribution of the i-statistic for p.
"Some improvement in power can be achieved simply by avoiding inefficient test specifications.
Abuaf and Jorion (1990), for example, note that the early tests performed by Adler and Lehman
122.3.4. Tests Using Cross Sections of Currencies
With 18 years of data, simultaneously testing N =4independent, identically-
distributed currencies would expand the data set sufficiently to reject (since 18.4 =
72).Hakkio (1984) was the first to suggest using cross-section data to gain power;
he employed GLS to allow for cross-exchange rate correlation in the residuals in
four exchange rates against the dollar. Despite the enhanced power of his test,
Hakkio was unable to reject the random walk model.
Abuaf and Jorion (1990) perform similar tests, running autoregressions in
levels using GLS for ten countries's currencies against the US dollar over the period
1973-1987. The longer time series and the larger cross-section does generate more
power, but nevertheless permits only the weakest of rejections of the random walk
hypothesis —atthe 10% significance level using one-sided tests. These results
roughly fit ourcalibration above: with 14.5 years of data and (say) 5 independent
bilateral exchange rates, we have the equivalent of 72 years of data. Thus, even
with this size cross-section, we would expect rejections to be marginal. It would
be interesting to see if adding more recent data to their sample would lead to
more decisive rejections.
In an interesting recent study, Cumby (1993) makes clever use of the Economists
'Hamburger Standard,' which each year reports the dollar price of McDonald's Big
Mac hamburgers in up to 25 countries. Although only about 7 years (1987-1993)
of data are available, Cumby finds that the large cross-section yields enough power
to detect substantial reversion toward the law of one price. In fact, deviations from
Big-Mac parity exhibit remarkably little persistence, with only 30 percent of the
deviation in one year persisting to the next. This fact seems striking given that a
large fraction of the 'goods' embodied in a Big Mac, including local infrastructure
costs and labor, are essentially nontraded.
How can Cumby's finding of relatively rapid convergence to 'hamburger PPP'
be reconciled with most other studies of PPP, which find relatively slow rates
of convergence? One factor may be that relatively few of the currency pairs in
Cumby's sample were actually floating against one another. As we have already
seen, convergence appears easier to detect in fixed rate than in floating rate data.
Second, peso problems may lead to understated standard errors: the Big Mac sam-
ple includes a number of relatively high inflation countries —Argentina,Brazil,
(1983) —whichestimated autoregressions of real exchange rate changes —were likely to be much
less powerful than similar tests performed on the levels of the real exchange rate. Cheung and
Lai (1993c) apply a more powerful version of the Dickey-Fuller test due to Elliot, Rothenberg
and Stock (1992).
13Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia and Thailand—whose currencies are generally
pegged except for the occasional large realignment.12 Finally, McDonald's own
pricing policies may produce a more rapid rate of convergence in Big Mac prices
than in broader aggregate price indexes.
2.3.5. Tests Using Longer Time Series
The second approach to improving power is to extend the sample period. Frankel
(1986), for example, uses 116 years (1869-1984) of data for the dollar/pound real
exchange rate. He finds that a simple first-order autoregression yields a coefficient
of 0.86, which implies that PPP deviations have an annual decay rate of 14 percent
and a half life of 4.6 years. His rejection of the unit root null is significant at
the 5% level, using Dickey-Fuller confidence intervals. Another early attempt to
use long samples to test convergence towards PPP is Edison (1987), who looks
at dollar/pound.data for the years 1890-1978. Edison uses an error-correction
mechanism [see also Papell (1994)], regressing the change in the log of the nominal
exchange rate, onthe contemporaneous change in the log of relative prices.
— and the lagged real exchange rate, (s —p
—p)_i:
=oo+ ai[L(p —p)1 +02(5— p— (2.12)
Edisonestimates 02= 0.09,i.e., that the nominal exchange rate decays towards
PPP at a statistically-significant 9 percent per year, implying a half life of roughly
7.3 years. In a similar exercise, Johnson (1990) uses 120 years of Canadian dol-
lar/U.S. dollar exchange rate data. He, too, is able to reject the random walk
hypothesis, and finds a half life for PPP deviations of 3.1 years.
Abuaf and Jorion (1990) use time series data from 1901-1972 for eight cur-
rencies. Their point estimates suggest a half-life of PPP deviations of 3.3years.
and they are easily able to reject a random walk. Both their results and Frankel's
are consistent with the simple model calibrated above. Glen (1992) uses variance
ratios to test for mean reversion in the real exchange rate for 9 bilateral exchange
rates over the 1900-87 period. Glen, too, finds strong evidence of mean reversion.
It must be emphasized that in addition to extending the sample, the long-
sample studies discussed above all combine relatively low variance pre-Bretton-
Woods exchange rate data with the highly volatile post-Bretton-Woods data. For
the simple first-order AR process specified in (2.9), the variance of the real ex-
change rate does not affect the power of the test. If, however, the real exchange
'2See Karen Lewis's chapter in this Handbook for a discussion of thepeso problem.
14rate is better described by a richer ARMA process, and if there are different pa-
rameters governing fixed versus floating rates, the test results may be heavily
affected by the inclusion of fixed rate periods. Thus these papers leave unresolved
the question of whether mean reversion would be detected in 100 years of floating
rate data.
Lothian and Taylor (1994) is an interesting attempt to cast some light on this
issue. Their data set consists of almost two centuries of data for the dollar-pound
(1791-1990) and franc-pound (1803-1990)realexchange rates. Using only the
post-Bretton-Woods portion of the data, they are not able to reject the random
walk hypothesis for either exchange rate. But when the entire sample is used, the
random walk null is easily rejected for either rate. Moreover, using a simple Chow
test to compare first-order AR coefficients before and after Bretton Woods, they
find that one cannot reject the hypothesis of no structural change. In fact, if one
estimates a simple AR (1) model on the pre-Bretton-Woods data, it outperforms
a random walk model on post-Bretton-Woods data at one- to five-year horizons.
Thus Lothian and Taylor conclude that there is no evidence for the view that the
inclusion of fixed-rate periods biases unit roots tests of the real exchange rate.
Of course, there is at least one striking difference between fixed and floating
regimes: Under fixed rates, deviations from PPP must be eliminated by domestic
price level movements. The error correction specification (2.12) is ideally suited to
measure the degree to which reversion toward PPP occurs through the nominal
exchange rate versus through prices. Under floating rates, both Edison (1987)
and Johnson (1990) cannot reject the hypothesis that all of the reversion towards
PPP is due to exchange rate movements.
Finally, we note two recent studies that have tested to see whether long-run
real exchange rate data is better characterized by fractionally integrated processes
rather than by the usual ARMA models. Diebold, Husted and Rush (1991) look
at the gold-standard period, encompassing over a hundred years of data, and find
that little power is added by allowing for fractional integration. They are able to
strongly reject the random walk model, but in most cases their estimates suggest
that a simple ARMA model best describes real exchange rates.
Cheung and Lai (1993a) arrive at a somewhat different conclusion using a
similar technique. Using a shorter time sample (1914-72) than DHR, they are
unable to reject a random walk model against fractional and ARMA alternatives.
However, they estimate the parameter d in eq. (2.8) to be about 0.5, suggesting
evidence of fractional integration in real exchange rates. They also show that the
power of fractionally-integrated alternatives to reject a randomwalk when the
15true process has d —0.5is considerably greater than that of standard ARMA
alternatives.
2.3.6. A Caveat: Sample Selection or "Survivorship" Bias in Long-
Horizon Tests of PPP
One interesting question that has not previously been raised in the long-sample
PPP literature is whether "survivorship" bias might exaggerate the extent to
which PPP holds in the long run. Specifically, the countries for which very long-
run PPP series are easily available tend to be those few who have continuously
been among the world's wealthiest nations. Countries that grew very fast from
a low level (e.g., Japan), and countries that were once rich but are no longer so
(e.g., Argentina) have not been studied as extensively. But these are precisely the
countries for which one might expect the relative price of nontraded goods to have
changed most dramatically (see our discussion of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in
section 3), and for which tests of long-run PPP are most likely to fail.
To intuitively gauge the importance of this sample-selection effect, we consider
data for the Argentine austral against the US dollar and the British pound over
the period 1913-1988. The Argentine CPI and nominal exchange rate data come
from Cavallo (1986), except for the post-1980 data which is from International
Financial Statistics.
As Figure 1 shows, with the exception of the well-known massive overvaluation
of the austral during the early 1980s, there is a steady decline of the austral over
the period. The real austral has fallen by roughly 80 percent (in log terms) since
the beginning of the century, a rate of decline of almost 1% per year. This trend
is highly statistically significant, as Table 1 illustrates.'3 Moreover, the strong
rejections of a unit root that emerge in the pound/dollar data are absent here.
Even with seventy-five years of data, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that
the detrended austral/dollar or austral/pound exchange rates follow a random
walk.
'3As he table also illustrates, however, the time trend is not significant under the alternative
hypothesis of a stationary real exchange rate.
16Table 1
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Regressions
on. Argentine/American and Argentine/British CPI Real Exchange Rates
q .s— p + p
qt =c, +atqt.i + i (1 —L)qj_1+ Ct
Austral/dollarAustral/pound
Sample Period 1913 —1988 1913 —1988
N 74 74
—0.931 —1,466
t-stat (against ao0) —3.21 —3.14
a1 0.808 0.764
t-stat (against a =1) —3.20 —3.12
1% critical value —3.52 —3.52





Although only suggestive, these results indicate that one must be cautious in
interpreting results from long-run PPP tests, as the tendency towards long-run
PPP may not apply to countries whose incomes relative to the rest. of the world
have undergone sharp changes.
2.4. Stage-three tests: Cointegration
At first glance, PPP testing would seem to provide the perfect context for En-
gte and Granger's (1987) work on cointegration.14 The techniques are designed
to test for long-run equilibrium relationships, for which the adjustment mecha-
nism remains unspecified. Cointegration tests are thus liberated from stage-one
concerns about endogeneity and left-out variables. Moreover —and,as we shall
see, more controversially —cointegrationtests hold forth the promise of testing
14For a review of the cointegraton literature and its applications to macroeconomcs, see Camp-
bell and Perron (1991).
17weaker versions of PPP, since they require only that some linear combination
of exchange rates and prices be stationary. In other words, stage-two tests ask
whether the real exchange rate q —Pt—pis stationary. Stage-three tests
ask only whether
St,"Pt + fp (2.13)
is stationary for any constantand.Anyincremental power from stage-three
tests over stage-two tests must therefore come from relaxing the symmetry and
proportionality restrictions that= = 1.In the discussion below, we will
distinguish between trivariate tests that place no restrictions on the coefficients
in (2.13), and bivari ate tests that impose the symmetry restriction jt =_l5
Why might j not equal one? Consider the following model used by Taylor
(1988), Fisher and Park (1991), and Cheung and Lai (1993a,b). First, assume
that PPP holds exactly for traded goods so that
(2.14)
where pT is the time I (log) home price of traded goods. Second, assume that the
overall price index consists of a weighted average of traded and nontraded goods
prices:
(2.15)
where p" is the time t home price of nontraded goods, for which PPP does not
necessarily obtain. The price index abroad is similar to (2.15), with weights (
and 1 —. Finally,the price of nontraded goods is assumed to be proportional
(in the limit) to the price traded goods:
Po+PT+t (2.16)
+ p7' + (2.17)
where the residuals andare stationary. Given eqs. (2.14) -(2.17),a regression
of the form




'5A stage-two test, which imposes ji= —f=1,may simply be thought of as the univariate
case in this categorization.
'6We are implicitly assuming that the home and foreign price indices are not themselves
cointegrated. If they are, one can impose the assumption p =pin the cointegrating regression.
18(2O 7+c(l—y)
One possible explanation of why the slope coefficients in eqs. (2.16) and (2.17)
might not equal one is simply that there is a trend in the relative prices of traded
and nontraded goods. Another explanation, offered by Taylor (1988), Fisher and
Park (1991), and Cheung and Lai (1993a,b) is that errors in measuring nontraded
goods prices can imply ,q1. But can measurement error interfere with the
proportionality of pt" and p? One possibility is to think of pN as an index of
nontraded goods prices that is subject to either "fixed-weight" or "new goods"
bias. (For simplicity assume that no such bias exists in the traded-goods price in-
dex.) Fixed-weight bias results when fixed-weight price indices confront changing
relative prices. Bryant and Cecchetti (1993) show how these effects can generate
permanent upward index movements when relative prices change, and therefore
bias measured inflation upward. A second source of bias comes from the intro-
duction of new goods, which one can think of having high implicit prices prior to
their introduction.
Thus, in principle, it is possible to think of plausible reasons why one might
want to allow for z 1 in eq. (2.13). We turn next to giving a brief overview
of cointegration methods.
2.4.1.Techniquesand Potential Applications to Real Exchange Rates
Cointegration techniques ask whether a group of nonstationary variables can be
combined to produce a stationary variable. If so, the nonstationary variables are
said to be cointegrated. More precisely, consider the N x K matrix X, which
consists of all the dependent and independent variables in the system. Suppose,
for example, that individually, the variables are integrated of order one (i.e., are
stationary in first differences, as is the case with exchange rates and prices).'7
Then if there exists a linear combination of the data, given by the I x N vector
B(i), such that B(i)X is stationary, then we say that X is cointegrated. Denoting
the matrix of all vectors that yield stationary results by B, the rank of B (r<N)
gives the number of cointegrating vectors.
Early applications of cointegration methods to testing PPP were based on a
three-step procedure. In the first stage, one tests the exchange rate and the two
'7Ogaki and Park (1990) distinguish between 'deterministic' and 'stochastic' cointegration.
The former is satisfied if a linear combination of X is stationary around a deterministic trend,
whereas the latter requires that the linear combination of X contain no trend. Our definition
is essentially one of deterministic cointegration.
19domestic price series for unit roots, using the augmented Dickev- Fuller test as in
eq.(2.6)above. For the bivariate case, of course, there are only two series, the
exchange rate and relative prices.
Assuming that one cannot reject the random walk hypothesis for any of the
variables, the second stage is to estimate the cointegrating regression (2.18) using
OLS. For the bivariate case one imposes =—1f.(If one can reject the unit root
hypothesis for at least one variable, but cannot for at least one other variable, one
cannot reject the no-cointegration null.)
Cointegration of prices and exchange rates implies that the error term in eq.
(2.18), e, is stationary. Thus, the third step is to use the OLS residuals from
(2.18) to run the Dickey-Fuller regression (2.6), but with the time trend omitted.
and to test the hypothesis that a2 =1.Using this approach, prices and exchange
rates are not cointegrated under the null hypothesis, whereas they are cointegrated
under the alternative hypothesis a2 < 1.18
Thethree-step method is inherently inefficient in part because it requires
choosing, somewhat arbitrarily, a single right-hand side variable. More recent PPP
tests have been able to avoid this inefficiency, using a technique due to Johansen
(1991). Johansen proposed a one-step full-information maximum-likelihood es-
timator for estimating the coefficients in specifications such as eq. (2.18), and
simultaneously testing for the presence of a unit root. Unlike the method above,
the ML estimates are not influenced by which variable is on the left-hand side of
the single e uation regression. The parameter estimates are thus more efficient.
and the Johansen test for cointegration thus more powerful than a two-step test.19
Horvath and Watson (1993) extend the Johansen methodology to allow for con-
straints that represent long-run equilibrium conditions; this effectively transforms
the Johansen test into a stage-two procedure.2°
2.4.2. Empirical ftesults of Cointegrating Tests of PPP
A plethora of studies have applied cointegration methods to testing PPP. A partial
list includes Corbae and Ouliaris (1988), Enders (1988), Kim (1990), Mark (1990),
'8Fisher and Park (1991) employ a test proposed by Park that takes cointegration to be the
null hypothesis and no cointegration to be the alternative. In essence, this test is constructed
by adding a time polynomial to the right-hand side of eq. (2.6), and testing its significance.
t9Cheung and Lai (1993c) provide evidence for the Johansen test's higher power.
20For an application of the Horvath and Watson procedure, see Edison, Gagnon, and Melick
(1994).
20Fisher and Park (1991), Cheung and Lai (1993a), and Kugler and Lenz (1993).
Surveys of this material include Giovannetti (1992) and Breuer (1994).
These studies reveal several systematic features of the data. First, rejections of
the no-cointegration null occur less frequently for currency pairs that are floating
than currency pairs that are fixed; this finding is consistent with the stage-two
results discussed in section (2.3). Second, one finds that tests based on CPI price
levels tend to reject less frequently than tests based on WPIs. One explanation
for this finding is that consumer price indices have a higher nontraded goods
component than wholesale prices, which tend to weight manufactured goods more
heavily.2'
A third common finding is that for post-Bretton-Woods floating exchange
rates, rejections of the no-cointegration null occur more frequently for trivariate
systems (where p and p enter separately) than for bivariate systems (where they
enter as p—p'), or for stage-two tests (where the coefficient on p—p is constrained
to be one.)22 Weakening the proportionality and symmetry restrictions therefore
makes the residuals appear more stationary.
At first glance, these results seem to provide a strong endorsement for stage-
three tests (cointegration) over stage-two tests, since they are generally more
successful in rejecting the random walk hypothesis. The problem, unfortunately,
is that the estimates of jàndvary wildly across the various studies based on
modern floating ra.te data, and are often rather implausible. Cheung and Lai, for
example, find coefficients that range from 1.03 to 25.4 for CPIs, and 0.3 to 11.4 for
WPIs, with most of the coefficients coming in above 1. Imposing the symmetry
restriction (looking at the bivariate case instead of the trivariate case) reduces
this range only slightly.
Rationalizing these extreme empirical estimates of /1isdifficult, to say the
least. How large a bias, for example, can be rationalized by the model embodied
in. eqs. (2.14) -(2.17)?Bryant and Cecchetti (1993) attempt to measure the size
of 'weighting bias' by comparing CPI-index inflation with the rate of inflation that
emerges as a common component across goods included in the CPI index. They
estimate that weighting bias leads to an overstatement of inflation of about 0.6%
21Keynes (1932) sharply criticized Churchill's Exchequer for using WPIs when making PPP
calculations to evaluate Britain's decision to return to its pre-World War I gold parity. Keynes
argued WPIs were misleading as index of the real exchange rate because they did not sufficiently
reflect nontraded goods prices. McKinnon (1971) also argues that PPP should hold to a much
greater extent for WPIs than for CPIs.
See, for example, Cheung and Lai (1993a), Mark (1990), and Kugler and Lenz (1993).
21per annum for the CPI and about 0.35% per annum for the personal consumption
expenditure deflator. Lebow, Roberts and Stockton (1992) attempt to estimate
the size of the new goods bias, and find that it leads to an overstatement of
inflation by at most 0.5% per annum. Thus, taken together, these two sources of
measurement error bias might raise consumer price inflation by roughly 1 percent
per year. Then, if inflation averages 5%, these effects might raise from 1 to 1.2,
implying that =0.83.This of course, assumes that there is no similar bias in
the traded goods index, which would push ,.tbacktowards one.
Nor can a trend rise in nontraded relative to traded goods prices explain val-
ues of /4farfrom one. Assuming that both monetary factors and productivity
differentials are trend stationary, the coefficient in eq. (2.16) turns out to be
=2in +\a)/'\m,where)'mand.A.. are the rates of money growth, and traded
relative to nontraded goods productivity growth respectively. Thus if we take
inflation to 5% and the trend traded/nontraded goods productivity growth differ-
ential to be 2%, then '= 1.4,and jz =0.71.
Clearly, it can be very difficult to interpret the results of cointegration tests
when estimates of the cointegrating vector has no apparent economic meaning.23
One possible explanation for the wide-ranging coefficient estimates is small-sample
bias. Banerjee eta!.(1986) show that in finite samples, cointegrating regressions
can result in substantial bias, and that the severity of this bias is related to R2
—theysuggest that regressions with R2 < 0.95 are likely to lead to substantial
bias. The problem of low R2 is, of course, especially likely to plague exchange
rate regressions over floating rate data.
Indeed, cointegration tests seem to yield much more reliable results when esti-
mated over long sample periods, rather than just over post-Bretton-Woods data.
Kim (1990), for example, uses WPI and CPI real exchange rates for the US against
five countries —Canada,France, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom —during
the 1900-1987 period. He is always able to reject no cointegration, but he finds
coefficients that are strikingly close to one in all cases but for that of Canada.24
23SeealsoHakkio and Rush (1991) and Breuer (1994) for critiques of unit root and cointe-
grationtests of PPP.
24Kim runs the cointegrating regression (2.13) for the CPI and WPI respectively, and finds
coefficients of 0.99 and 0.98 (France), 0.99 and 0.98 (Italy), 1.00 and 0.98 (Japan), 0.96 and
1.00 (United Kindgom), and 0.73 and 0.55 (Canada). The R2 are high in all these regressions
(averaging around 0.96) except for Canada, in accordance with the theoretical results of Banerjee
et.at. (1986).
222.4.3. Summary: What have we learned from stage-three tests?
There have been a plethora of papers applying cointegration testing to PPP, but
on the whole it is not clear that technique has yet provided a net benefit over
earlier stage-two tests; indeed, it may have produced some misleading results due
to small sample bias. Over longer time periods, and for fixed rates, the bias
becomes less serious. Thus far, however, the results from cointegration tests on
long-horizon data have not produced any insights not available from stage-two
tests.25
2.5. Tests Using Disaggregated Price Data
In order to gain a deeper understanding of why PPP fails, a number of studies
have attempted to look at a central building block of PPP, the law of one price.
In his classic (1977) paper, Isard looks for, and finds, deviations from PPP
where one would least .expect them —inhighly disaggregated traded goods price
indices. He reports large and persistent deviations from the law of one price
in U.S. and German export transactions prices for various 2 though 5 digit SITC
categories (e.g., pumps, internal combustion engines, etc.) and in U.S. export unit
values in 7-digit A and B groupings when compared to similar unit values from
Canada, Germany and Japan. Isard goes on to demonstrate a positive correlation
between contemporaneous dollar exchange rates and relative dollar prices.26 He
speculates that this correlation might disappear at longer horizons, but (as with
other stage-one tests) does not formalize or test this conjecture explicitly.
Giovannini's (1988) paper is similar in spirit. He finds deviations from PPP
not only among disaggregated traded goods, but even among basic 'commodity'
manufactured goods, such as bail bearings, screws, nuts and bolts. Giovannini's
data (which come from the Bank of Japan) compare Japanese domestic and export
prices (on shipments bound for the US) during the floating rate period. In line
with Isard's results, Giovannini finds large and persistent deviations from the law
of one price that are strongly correlated with the nominal exchange rate.27
25iohansen and Julius (1992)arguethat deviations from PPP arid deviations from uncovered
interest parity may becointegrated,so that it is important to analyze both simultaneously. This
presumes, of course, that deviations from PPP have a unit root component.
26of course, such correlations can be trusted only to the extent that the exchange rate and
relative prices are stationary.
27lsard and Giovannini both suggest that sticky nominal prices may account for the exchange
rate/relative price correlation. See Frankel and Rose's paper in this Handbook for adetailed
discussion of the effects of nominal exchange rate movements on the real economy
232.5.1. Disaggregated Price Data for the Modern Floating Rate Period
Several recent studies that employ disaggregated data have investigated the extent
to which departures from PPP are caused mainly by the presence of nontraded
goods versus deviations from the law of one price in traded goods. To see this
dichotimization, suppose the real exchange rate is q st—Pt+ p asdefined in
eq.(2.5),and the price index in each country is a weighted average of traded and
nontraded goods prices Pt=yp+ (1 —7)p' asin eq. (2.15). Combining these
two expressions, we can write
(2.21)
so that real exchange rate depends on deviations from the law of one price in
traded goods, as well as on the relative price o traded and nontraded goods
within each country.
One study that addresses this issue is Engel (1993). Engel examines a multi-
country data set of individual prices, including goods of varying degrees of traded-
ness. Engel finds that monthly fluctuations from the law of one price for individual
traded goods across countries are very large in comparison with fluctuations in
relative prices within a country. Even for apparently homogenous traded goods
such as bananas, the deviations from the law of one price can be large and volatile.
Rogers and Jenkins (1993) extend this result in two ways. First, they sort out
traded and nontraded components of the CPI and find that, onaverage, 81% of
the variance in the real CPI exchange rate is explained by changes in the relative
price of traded goods (which they measure using food prices).
Both of these studies seem to support the view that deviations from the law of
one price in traded goods —thefirst term on the right-hand side of eq. (2.21) —
dominateshort-term real exchange rate fluctuations. One important qualification
to these results is that they are based on retail (CPI) data, and even the 'traded'
goods embody substantial nontraded inputs. The retail price of bananas includes
not only the traded goods input, but local shipping, rent and overhead for the
retailer, and labor. Indeed, for many seemingly highly-traded goods, these indirect
costs can far outweigh direct traded-goods costs.
Engel and Rogers (1994) provide some further perspective on this issue. Their
analysis is based on CPI data for both U.S. and Canadian cities for 14 categories
of consumer prices. They find that the variability in theprice of a good in two
different locations within a country dependson the distance (and the squared
distance) between locations, as in gravity models of trade. However, they find
24that holding other variables (including distance) constant, the variability in prices
between two U.S. or two Canadian cities is much less than between a Canadian
and a U.S. city. Crossing the U.S.-Canadian border adds as much to the variability
of prices as adding (a minimum) of 2500 miles between cities within a country.
Engel and Rogers interpret their finding as strong evidence that prices are
sticky in local currency, and that changes in the exchange rate lead to deviations in
the law of one price. While their evidence is striking, retail goods generally contain
substantial nontraded components, and these components may be much larger
across countries than within countries. For example, labor may he much more
mobile between New York and Los Angeles than between cross-border neighbors
such as Buffalo and Toronto.
Rogers and Jenkins (1993) look at the persistence of deviations from PPP for
each component of the CPI across 11 OECD countries as well as across 54 disag-
gregated goods between the US and Canada. For each good (or index component)
i, they test whether deviations in the law of one price
qt(i) =— pt(i)+ p(i) (2.22)
follow a random walk, using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test in eq. (2.6) with-
out a time trend. (Thus this is a stage-two-type test.) Interestingly, for highly
nontraded index components (such as rent), Rogers and Jenkins are unable to
reject a random walk for any of the 39 country pairs. They occasionally reject,
however, when food prices are used as the index. When looking at more disaggre-
gated individual goods prices between the U.S. and Canada over samples which
run from the mid-1970s to 1990, they find similar results: 1) it is not possible to
reject a random walk in the relative price of haircuts (a nontraded good); and 2)
rejection rates are considerably higher for potatoes, eggs, etc. (which are taken
to be traded goods).
While disaggregation appears quite informative, the papers by Engel and by
Rogers and Jenkins all use relatively short sample periods. They may have enough
data to detect statistical differences in relative-price variances, hut not enough to
provide much power to detect differences in persistence.
2.5.2.TestsUsing Disaggregated Price Data and Longer Times Series
Samples
In order to obtain a longer time series of disaggregated price data and to gain
some perspective on the behavior of prices during recent periods, we consider data
25from the period 1630-1789 in England and France for three commodities: wheat,
charcoal and butter.28 All prices are in terms of silver (implicitly we assume that
the law of one price holds for silver.)
The individual and relative (log) prices are graphed in Figures 2-4, which
reveal several striking aspects of the data. First, note the striking volatility of
goods prices within a country and of relative prices for the same good across
countries. Deviations in PPP for wheat are the most volatile, with a standard
deviation of 30% per annum. Relative butter and charcoal prices follow, with
annual standard deviations of 17% and 12% respectively.
The second striking fact is the appearance of trends in individual commodity
prices. The log price of wheat, measured in hectoliters per gram of silver and
depicted in Figure 2, shows little or no trend between 1630 and 1789, averaging
about 4.08 during the sample. Indeed, as Froot, Kim and Rogoff (1994) note, this
level is strikingly near today's relative price of 4.00.29 Over a time span this long
—almostfour centuries —itmight be fair to assume that the absence of a relative
price trend suggests roughly equal growth rates in wheat and silver productivity.
For charcoal prices, shown in Figure 3, there is a slight upward trend over the
sample. In addition, charcoal is on average 25% more expensive in France than
in England over the sample. The price differential probably reflects endowments
(England had a greater domestic supply), though the price differential is, of course,
bounded by customs charges and transportation costs.
Figure 4 depicts the (log) price of butter, measured in kilograms of butter per
gram of silver, for the years 1717 to 1789. Butter is probably the least traded of
the three goods in our sample, since there was no refrigeration during this period.
Note that in contrast to charcoal, butter's price was initially 2.7 times higher in
England than in France, though this ratio drops to 1.8 by the end of the period.
(One possible explanation is that France's industrialization during the mid and
latter parts of the 18th century drove up nontraded prices relative to England,
where by 1717 the industrial revolution was already in full swing.) In contrast to
wheat and charcoal, the (silver) price of butter trended upward during the period.
If one thinks of dairy products as being more labor intensive than grains and
charcoal, this fact is consistent with the Baumol-Bowen hypothesis, discussed in
28The main data sources are Beveridge (1939), Hauser (1936), and Jastram (1981). For further
discussion of the data, see Froot, Kim and Rogoff (1994), who look at deviations from the law
of one price for a six-hundred year data set for England and Holland.
29This is based on a price $3.40 per American bushel of wheat and $5.45 per troy ounce of
silver.
26section 3. Indeed, the price of butter relative to silver has continued to rise and
stands today at roughly five times the price at the beginning of the eighteenth
century. Put differently, if the relative price of butter to silver had remained
constant since the early 17th century, butter would today cost approximately
$0.43 per pound.
The third striking feature of the relative prices —especiallywheatis the
strong appearance of stationarity. To check this more formally, we ran unit root
tests on the English/French relative price of wheat, charcoal and butter. The
results reported in Table 2 below are based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller spec-
ification (2.6), except that the time trend has been omitted (including a time
trend does not affect the results). For wheat and charcoal, one can reject the unit
root null at the 1% level. The autoregressive coefficient for the relative price of
wheat is 0.445, implying a half life for PPP deviations of roughly one year. For




on English/French Relative Prices
q(i) =s_p(i)+p*(i)
q(i) =a0+ aiqt_i(i) + 'i (1 —L)q_ (i) + Et(Z)
Wheat Charcoal Butter
Sample Period 1632 —1789 1702 —1789 1719 —1784
N 158 74 41
0.445 0.303 0.737
t-stat —7.09 —8.95 —2.05
1% critical value —3.47 —3.52 —3.60
0.103 0.10 0.08
R2 0.262 0.533 0.112
DW 2.02 1.43 1.75
0.293 0.119 0.172
Interestingly, we cannot reject the random-walk hypothesis for the relative
price of butter, despite the relatively long time span. The estimated autoregressive
coefficient is 0.74, an implied half-life of 2 years. This result that the half life of
27PPP deviations for butter is greater than for other commodities accords with our
intuition, as butter is more likely to be nontraded than wheat or charcoal over
this period. It is also consistent with the notion that the power to reject the
random-walk hypothesis falls as the nontraded component of goods increases.
3. Structural Models of Deviations from PPP
Until now, all the evidence we have looked at has been based on price and exchange
rate data. In this section, we discuss a number of studies that attempt to explain
empirically deviations from PPP in terms of more fundamental factors such as
productivity, government spending and strategic pricing decisions by firms. Our
focus is on medium- to long-term movements; Frankel and Rose deal with short-
term fluctuations elsewhere in this volume. We begin by reviewing some of the
key theoretical issues, and then turn to the empirical evidence.
3.1.Productivity,Government Spending and the Relative Price of Non-
tradables
Of the many models that have been put forth to explain long-term deviations in
consumption-based PPP, the most popular and enduring one is due to Balassa
(1964) and Samuelson (1964). They posited that, after adjusting for exchange
rates, CPIs in rich countries will be high relative to those in poor countries,
and that CPIs in fast-growing countries will rise relative to CPIs in slow-growing
countries. We will formalize their analysis shortly, but the main idea is as follows.
Balassa and Samuelson argue that technological progress has historically been
faster in the traded goods sector than in the nontraded goods sector (perhaps
because traded goods are weighted towards high-innovation agricultural or man-
ufacturing goods) and, crucially, that this traded-goods productivity bias is more
pronounced in high-income countries. As a consequence, CPI levels tend to be
higher in wealthy countries. Why? A rise in productivity in the traded goods
sector will bid up wages in the entire economy; producers of nontraded goods will
only be able to meet the higher wages if there is a rise in the relative price of
nontraded goods.
To take an example, consider the fact that nontraded goods are cheaper in
india than in Switzerland. Although Switzerland's absolute level of productivity
is higher than that of India, the productivity in its nontraded-goods sector relative
to its traded-goods sector is lower.
28It is important to distinguish the Balassa-Samuelson effect from the related
'Baumol-Bowen' effect. Baumol and Bowen (1966) argued that within a country,
there is a broad tendency for service intensive goods (education, health care, auto
repair, banking, etc.) to rise over time. Historically, productivity growth in ser-
vices has tended to be much slower than in more capital intensive manufacturing
industries. This argument is obviously closely parallel to a key building block of
the Balassa-Samuelson model, since there is a heavy overlap between nontradables
and service-intensive goods. Note, however, that the presence of a Baumol-Bowen
effect is not necessarily sufficient to imply a Balassa-Samuelson effect.3°
It is arguable whether one should expect to detect a Balassa-Samuelson effect
in really long-run data. Even though technology can differ across countries for
extended periods, the free flow of ideas, together with human and physical capital
produces a tendency towards long-run convergence of incomes. Of course, in
the final analysis, the effect of income growth on PPP is an empirical question.
Before looking at the empirical evidence, however, we examine more closely the
theoretical underpinnings of the model; readers whose main interest is in the
empirical material may wish to skip to the next subsection.
3.2. A Small Country Model of the Balassa-Samuelson Effect
In this section, we derive the central equation of the Balassa-Samuelson relation-
ship between the real (CPI) exchange rate arid the productivity differential be-
tween traded and nontraded goods.31 One important point, generally overlooked
in the literature, is that even balanced growth across the two sectors can lead to
a rise in the relative price of nontradables if nontraded goods are relatively labor
intensive.
Consider the case of a small, open economy, that produces both traded and
nontraded goods. The sectoral production functions are
=AT(LT)°T(KT)'-°T (3.1)
yN =Ar(Lr)ON(K[I)1_ON (3.2)
30Willthere ever be a service productivity revolution to turn the Baumol-Boweneffect onits
head? The possibility cannot be dismissed. Banking services have become vastly more efficient
in recent years, with innovations ranging from ATMs to derivative securities; it seems plausible
that the information revolution may someday lead to a long pause, if not a reversal, of the trend
differential in productivity growth.
3tThe analysis here is based on Froot and Rogoff (1991b); see also Rogoff (1992).
29where yT (yN) denote domestic output of the traded and nontradedgood respec-
tively, and K',L', and A' are capital, labor and productivity in sector I. Let us
initiallyassume that capital is mobile both internationally and across the two sec-








where R is the rental rate on capital (determined in world markets), W is the
wage rate (measured in tradables) and p is the relative price of nontradables.
Since we assume.no adjustment costs, it is convenient to omit time subscripts.
The key result is that with perfect capital mobility, the relative price ofnon-
tradables pN is governed entirely by the production side of theeconomy. Equa-
tions (3.3)-(3.6) involve four equations in four variables, KT/LT, KN/LN, W, and
P, which can be solved recursively as follows: Given the constant returns to scale
production functions (3.1) and (3.2), eq. (3.3) implies a unique level of KT/LT
consistent with the world rate of return on capital R. Given KT/LT,eq. (3.5)
determines the economy-wide wage rate W. The remaining two equations (3.4)
and (3.6) then determine KN/LN and P.
By log-differentiating eqs.(3.3)-(3.6), one can obtain a (slight) generalization
of the classic Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis:
(9N/gT)T (3.7)
where d logx. Then if both sectors have the same degree of capital intensity
—jf9N =— thenthe percentage change in the relative price of traded goods
is simply equal to— N,the productivity growth differential between the traded
and nontraded sectors. If, however 0N > 0T (one generally thinks of nontraded
goods as being more labor intensive), then even balanced productivity growth
(aT =aN)will lead to an appreciation of the relative price of traded goods.32
Note that in the small open economy with perfect factor mobility, demand
factors do not affect they only affect a country's consumption basket.33 This
32De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) extend this model oa1Iow for changes in the terms of trade
(the relative price of importabks and exportables).
33For further discussion, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), ch. 4.
30is not the case for an economy fully (or partially) shut off from world capital
markets ,since/? is no longer tied down by world markets. (The same is true, of
course, for a large economy.) In this case, eqs. (3.3)-(3.6) must be supplemented
by the demand side of the model.34
Demand factors can also be important in the small-country case in the short
run if labor and/or capital cannot be transferred instantly across sectors.35 Froot
and Rogoff (1991) show that in this case, government spending will tend to raise
the relative price of nontradables, if the spending falls disproportionately on non-
traded goods, relative to private expenditure shares. Rogoff (1992) shows that the
model also implies that temporary shocks to traded goods productivity can have
permanent effects on pN. The reason is that private agents can use international
capital markets to smooth their consumption of traded goods. As a result the
relative intratemporal price of traded and nontraded goods is smoothed.
Having discussed the basic theory underpinning the Balassa-Samuelsoni ap-
proach, we are now ready to examine the empirical literature.
3.3. Long-term Productivity Differentials and the Real Exchange Rate
Balassa was the first to formally test the proposition that richer countries have
higher real exchange rates; Balassa (1964), for example, reports the following
regression for a cross-section of twelve industrial countries for the year 1960:36
(P/SP')1 =a+ 8(GNP/POP) (3 8)
0.49 0.51 (8.33)
where P/SP is the inverse of the level of the real exchange rate. GNP/POP
is GNP/ population, and I statistics are in parentheses; the regression has 10
degrees of freedom. Balassa (1973) presents similar results. again findingthat
richer countries have higher (exchange-rate adjusted) price levels. Officer (197Gb)
surveys a host of follow-up studies that, on the whole, yieldedmuch more negative
results. Officer argued that Balassa's results are extremely sensitive to the year
chosen and to the countries included in the regression. Note that eq. (3.8) is
a test of a6solute purchasing power parity; some of the data sourcesused for
34This is a short-run result. In a representative agent model with constant discount rate 3,
the long-run interest rate is again tied down, and other demand factors do not enter into the
determination of pN
35Demandfactors will matter in the long run provided there is some fixedfactor(e.g.. land)
which can be transferred across sectors.
36Balassa does not provide the standard error on iorR2; the correlation coefficient is .92.
31early absolute PPP comparison include Gilbert and Kravis (1954), Gilbert e. al.
(1958), and Kravis et. al.(1975).
The most recent effort to construct absolute comparisons of PPP is Summers
and Heston (1991), who construct absolute PPP data for a broad range of coun-
tries. Generally, their data reveal striking differences in price levels between poor
countries as a group and rich countries as a group. Once divided into twogroups.
the within-group correlations between income and price level are much lessap-
parent (see their figure on p. 336).
The preceding studies dealt with the cross-sectional implications of Balassa-
Samuelson. Hsieh (1982) was the first to look at time series implications. His
study focused on Japanese and German real exchange rates vis-à-vis the United
States for the years 1954-1976. Hsieh's central regressions were of the form:
Pt —St—P/3 + th[aT
—a"]
—/92[a*T —aj+ /93 [Wt —st—w+ a —a*T}
(3.9)
where w is the (log) nominal wage rate. Hsieh found that the productivity dif-
ferential variables were significant and of the correct sign for both real exchange
rates, and that his OLS regression results were robust both to correcting for serial
correlation and to using instrumental variables techniques. It should be noted
that the variable —s—w+ a" —aT],which includes nominal wage differ-
entials, is extreme1y highly correlated with the lagged real exchange rate. Thus
Hsieh's results may be sensitive to whether or not this "error correction" term is
included.
Marston (1987) and Edison and Kiovan (1987) (discussed earlier) also present
evidence suggestive of a Balassa-Samuelson effect. Edison and Kiovan examine
time series data on the real exchange between the British pound and the Norwe-
gian krone for the years 1874-1971. This long time period allows them to detect
significant evidence of a productivity differential effect using both the real output
differential and a measure of the commodity/service productivity ratio differential.
Marston (1987) looks at the yen/dollar real exchange rate over the period
1973-1983, and calculates traded-nontraded goods productivity differentials using
OECD data that disaggregates the economy into ten subsectors. It is worthwhile
to digress briefly to explain his aggregation approach. He designates two sectors
as traded: manufacturing; and agricultural, hunting, fishing and forestry. Six
sectors are deemed nontraded: construction; wholesale and retail trade; restau-
rants and hotels; transport, storage and communication; finance, insurance, real
estate; business services, community, social and personal services; and govern-
ment services. Marston excludes the mining and quarrying sector, because it is
32energy intensive and therefore was very sensitive to OPEC pricing policies over
the period. For the same reason, he excludes the electricity, gas and water sector.
Using sectoral employment data, Marston calculates labor productivity dif-
ferentials between traded and nontraded goods, and argues that these variables
provide an extremely plausible explanation of the long-run trend real appreciation
of the yen against the dollar.
The evidence of later studies is somewhat mixed. Froot and Rogoff (199 la,b)
look at a cross-section of 22 OECD countries for the years 1950-1989. They find
that the correlation between productivity differentials and the real exchange rate
is weak at best, both for their full sample and for various subsamples.
Asea and Mendoza (1994), take a different approach; their analysis is based
on a dynamic two-country general equilibrium model. They take sectoral OECD
data to calculate relative traded goods prices for. fourteen OECD countries over
the period 1975-1985. They first regress the relative price of nontraded goods
for each country against traded-nontraded productivity differentials, and then
regress cross-country real exchange rates against the relative price of noritraded
goods (they try both actual and estimated). Asea and Meridoza conclude that
although the productivity differentials between traded and nontraded goods are
extremely significant in explaining changes in the relative price of nontraded goods
within each country, changes in nontraded goods prices account for only a small
and insignificant part of real exchange-rate changes across countries (using either
CPI or GDP deflators). Thus while the data revel evidence of a Baumol-Bowen
effect, the Balassa-Samuelson effect is more difficult to detect.
De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf (1994a) similarly conclude that differences
in productivity growth across traded and nontraded goods help explain the rel-
ative price of nontraded goods. (However, they reach somewhat more positive
conclusions than Asea and Mendoza concerning the ability of productivity dif-
ferentials to explain changes across countries in the real exchange rate; we will
discuss their results in more detail shortly.)
Note that if two countries have different weights on services in their consump-
tion baskets, then the Baumol-Bowen effect alone can produce significant trend
movements in CPI real exchange rates, even in the absence of a Balassa-Samuelson
effect. Suppose, for example, that two countries have identical technologies at all
times, but that one country has a higher share of services in the CPI. Then the
presence of a Baumol-Bowen effect is sufficient to yield a trend in the CPI real
exchange rate. If the Baumol-Bowen effect is indeed important —theevidence in
both Asea and Mendoza, and in De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf strongly sug-
33gests that it. isthen one must have convergence in tastes,notjust technologies.
for the real exchange rate to converge in the long run.
3.4. Demand Factors and the Real Exchange Rate
A striking feature of the Balassa-Samuelson model developed in section 3.2 is that
the real exchange rate depends entirely on supply factors; demand factors do not
enter. This property of the model depends on several assumptions:
1. the country is small and cannot affect the world interest rate;
2. capital is mohile internationally;
3. both capital and labor are instantaneously mobile across sectors internally;
4. there are constant returns to scale in the mobile factors (i.e., there is no
third factor in production such as land which is immobile across sectors).
If, for example, capital and labor are mobile across sectors in the long run
but not in the short run, demand factors can have a short-run impact on the real
exchange rate. The possibility that demand factors may matter, at least in the
short run, has been explored empirically by Froot and Rogoff (1991a,b), Rogoff
(1992) and by De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf (1994a).37
Froot and Rogoff (1991a) look at alternative explanations for the significant
shifts in real exchange rates over the EMS period. Between 1986 and 1991, for
example, Italy's CPI inflation rate exceeded Germany's by more than 15 percent,
while the lira/mark exchange rate remained fixed. Froot and Rogoff explore to
what extent relative growth in Italian government spending might account for this
phenomenon. In their model, it is assumed that government spending falls dispro-
portionately on nontraded goods, thereby bidding up their relative price. They
regress the real CPI exchange rate against various measures of productivity dif-
ferentials and government spending as a ratio to GNP. The government spending
variable consistently enters with correct sign in all the individual countryregres-
sions and is strongly significant in the pooled time series cross-section regressions.
Neither productivity differentials or government spending enters significantly.
37Ahmed(1987)also looks empirically at the effects of government spending on the real
exchange rate. His model, however, focuses on home-produced versus foreign goods (the terms
of trade), as opposed to traded versus nontrajed. He assumes that government spending falls
more heavily on foreign goods than does spending by domestic consumers, and he finds support
for this hypothesis on historical data for Great Britain.
34Froot and Rogoff suggest that government spending effects, because they are
transitory, may be difficult to pick up in highly volatile floating exchange rate data.
To pursue this conjecture, Froot and Rogoff (1991b) look at data for twenty-two
OECD countries for the period 1950-1989, a sample which includes both fixed and
floating rate data. They also modify their earlier model to allow for gradual factor
adjustment across sectors, implying that the effects of government spending will
only be temporary. Overall, they find that the government spending differential
consistently enters pooled regressions significantly and with the correct sign, both
over the full sample and over separate fixed and floating rate periods. Though
factor mobility causes the effect to die out over the long run, the half life appears
quite long —morethan five years.
Rogoff (1992) estimates a related model on quarterly data for the yen/dollar
rate over the period 1975-1990. Although government spending appears to he
highly correlated with the real exchange rate, it does not enter significantly into
the regressions once one controls for shocks to the world price of oil.
De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf (1994a) present a cross-country panel re-
gression that attempts to sort of the importance of demand and supply factors.
Their model is closely related to the model presented in section 3.1. Like Asea and
Mendoza (1994), they use the OECD intersectoral data base to construct measures
of productivity growth in the traded and nontraded goods sectors. The version
they use covers fourteen countries38 and twenty sectors; the data include both real
and nominal output permitting construction of sectoral price deflators as well as
detailed input data allowing derivation of total factor productivity levels.39 Their
method for classifying sectors between traded and nontraded is somewhat different
than Marston's, though yielding broadly similar results. De Gregorio, Giovannini,
and Wolf calculate total exports of each sector across all fourteen OECD coun-
tries and take the ratio to total production. They define a sector as tradable if
more than ten percent is exported. This leads them to classify as tradables all of
manufacturing, agriculture and mining; they also classify transportation services
as tradable. All other services, comprising 50-60 percent of GNP are classified
as nontradable. De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf then calculate total factor
productivity using Solow residuals.4° They also test for the effect of government
AustraIia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
39Stockman and Tesar (1994) have previously used this same data set in their work on inter-
national real business cycles.
40De Gregorio eat. useof total factor productivity, which controls for capital inputs, contrasts
with Marston's use of labor productivity. (Asea and Mendoza also use total factor productivity)
35spending on the relative price of nontradables.
Their results are very interesting and instructive. De Gregorio, Giovannini,
and Wolf's central regression is of the form:4'
(N —r)=+i [(ON/or) aT —aNJ+ /3291, + /33y (3.10)
where g is real government spending (excluding government investment) over real
GDP, y is real per capita income, i subscripts denote country and t subscripts
denote time. Note that the weight on tradable goods productivity growth a is
greater than the weight on a jf 0N > 6T, which is very plausible. As we dis-
cussed in section 3.1, balanced productivity growth is likely to raise the relative
price of nontradables in the small open economy. Because the rate of return on
capital is tied down by international capital mobility, productivity growth raises
the wage/rental ratio, and therefore raises the relative price of the labor-intensive
good.42 In constructing g, the share of government spending in GNP, De Grego-
rio, Giovannini, and Wolf use separate defiators to convert nominal government
spending to nominal GD P.43 Otherwise, because government spending has a higher
share of nontraded goods than overall GDP, changes in the relative price of non-
tradables will affect the ratio even if quantities are constant. (The OECD data
permits this adjustment.)..
Pooling data for all fourteen countries over the full 1971-1985 sample period
(they have 210 observations), De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf obtain
(N —T)=a,+ fl[(ON/or)
aT —aN]+ 829i,t + /3311i,t
0.234 1.974 0.281
(0.018) (0.119) (0.030)
where standard errors are in parentheses. The productivity, government spending
and income variables are all highly significant and of the theoretically predicted
It is not obvious however, that the total factor productivity is necessarily superior, since data
on capital inputs is notoriously unreliable.
41They alsoconsidera variant of their empirical model where the lagged rate of change of
nontraded goods prices enters into the regression; this modification does not substantially affect
the results.
42Strictly speaking, the coefficient in eq. (3.10) is correct for the case of perfect factor mobility.
When factors are immobile across sectors, the weights depend on shares in aggregate demand;
see Rogoff (1992).
43Frootand Rogoff (1991b) also attempt to control for this effect by using CPI and WPI
data to construct separate defiators for government spending and GNP, but their data are much
cruder.
36signs.
Although their model is not explicitly dynamic, De Gregorio, Giovannini, and
Wolf attempt to see whether demand factors matter in the long run by averaging
data for each country over time, and running a regression for the cross-section
data. They find that over the long run, the productivity differentials remain
extremely significant whereas the effects of demand factors (government spending
and income) become less important. It would be interesting to explore this issue
further by estimating a model that explicitly accounts for dynamic adjustment.
Recently, De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) have extended this analysis to incor-
porate term of trade shocks (shocks to the relative price of home exports versus
home imports). They find that the terms of trade are important empirically,
though productivity and government spending differentials continue to be impor-
tant. Relative incomes, however, become insignificant when terms of trade shocks
are included. They conclude that the income variable in the above regression may
be proxying for terms of trade shocks.
3.5.Pricingto Market
Most of our discussion in this section has focused on deviations from the law of one
price due to the presence of nontraded goods. We have paid relatively little atten-
tion to the factors that may cause deviations from the law of one price in traded
goods (except to note that one must be careful to recognize that many goods
that appear to be highly 'traded' in fact have a large nontraded component). The
empirical evidence, including Isard (1977), Giovannini (1988) and Erigel (1993),
strongly suggests that deviations from the law of one price in traded goods are
important in practice and that the short-run size and direction of these departures
appears to track closely nominal exchange rate movements. One obvious expla-
nation is that of short-term price rigidities, due, say, to menu costs in changing
prices. Frankel and Rose, as well as Garber and Svensson deal with price rigidities
elsewhere in this volume, discussing how short-term nominal rigidities can affect
the transmission of real and monetary disturbances.
Another theory of why there can be deviations from the law of one price in
traded goods is the 'pricing to market' theory of Krugman (1987) and Dornbusch
(1987). This literature is also covered by Feenstra elsewhere in this Handbook.
so our discussion here is brief. In the pricing to market framework, oligopolistic
suppliers are able to charge different prices for the same good in different countries:
thus the prices of BMWs can differ between Germany and the United States. If the
37BMWs are truly tradable, why isn't thisgap closed by goods market arbitrage?
The theory posits that there are important cases where companiescan separately
license the sale of goods at home and abroad. Ofcourse, the ability to price
discriminate across markets may be very limited in practice. In electronics, for
example, there exists an active "gray market" in which goods are purchased in
low-price countries for immediate resale in countries where the manufacturer is
attempting to charge a higher price.44
In addition to potentially explaining longer-run deviations from the law ofone
price, 'pricing to market' theories also have implications for the transmission of
monetary disturbances if there are nominal rigidities. The Dornbusch-Krugmari
models assume that in the short-run, costs are set in nominal terms in thecurrency
of the supplier. Then, if there is anexogenous appreciation in the home country's
nominal exchange rate (the pricing to market literature is partialequilibrium),
the real cost of supplying goods for foreign sale rises. If demandwere unit elastic,
the markup of price over cost would not be affected [see Marston,(1990)], but the
markup over cost on foreign goods will fall if the foreign price elasticity of demand
is greater than unity. (This would generally be the case for a monopolist with
non-zero marginal cost of production.) Indeed, much of the empirical literature
focuses on short-run transmission effects.
Kasa (1992) questions the price discrimination story as the underlying ratio-
nale for pricing to market. Why do studies such as Knetter (1989) find relatively
similar effects of exchange rates on markups across industries, if price discrimina-
tion is central?45 Kasa argues that pricing to market is better rationalizedusing
an adjustment cost framework, where either the firm faces some kind of adjust-
ment cost in changing prices or, as in Froot and Klemperer (1989), consumers face
fixed costs in switching between products. Froot and Klemperer point out that if
their adjustment cost story is correct, then changes in exchange rates thatare ex-
pected to be temporary should lead to much greater fluctuations in markups than
deviations that are expected to be permanent. They present some evidence that
is suggestive of their theory, under the assumption that privateagents generally
viewed the mid-1980s run up in the dollar as temporary.
A number of studies, including Knetter (1989), find that pricing to market
44The main defense against the "gray market" is for manufacturers to refuse to honor the
warranty except in the original country of sale. This strategy is obviously more likely to be
successful in the case of autos than for, say, VCRs.
45Elsewhere in this volume, Feenstra argues that the differences in "pass-through" of exchange-
rate changes across industries are in fact quite large.
38is more pronounced for German and Japanese exporters than it is for American
exporters. Recently, some explanations for this stylized fact have been unearthed.
Knetter (1993) finds that pricing to market behavior seems more similar across
countries if one controls for industry effects; U.S. exporters tend to be concen-
trated in industries where, globally, pricing to market behavior is less pronounced.
Rangan and Lawrence (1993) argue that part of the reason U.S. pricing to mar-
ket behavior seems less pronounced is that many U.S. firms sell their products
abroad to subsidi.ries, and that the pricing to market behavior takes place at the
subsidiary level.
Chosh and Wolf (1994) try to discriminate between menu costs and pricing
to market theories. Their data set consists of cover prices of the magazine Th
Economistfor eleven European countries and the United States for the years 1973-
1990. They argue that importance of lagged exchange rate changes on relative
price changes (across countries) supports the view that deviations from the law of
one price must be driven at least partly by menu costs. As we have argued above,
however, the pricing to market and menu cost theories of PPP deviations are not
mutually exclusive.
Finally, in an interesting recent paper, Feenstra and Kendall (1994) argue
that changes in price markups across countries over time may have a permanent
component and that, empirically, this effect may in some cases be as important as
the Balassa-Samuelson effect in explaining deviations from the law of one price.
The existence of a permanent component, of course, essentially requires that firms
be able to maintain segmentation across the markets indefinitely.
4. Conclusions
Over the past ten years, research on purchasing power parity has enjoyed a rebirth.
partly due to innovations in econometrics, and even more to the development of
new data sets that allow researchers to investigate both longer and more disaggre-
gated time series. The main positive result is that there does seem to be long-run
convergence to PPP, though further work on the issue of survivorship biaswould
be valuable. Also, the most convincing evidence on long-run convergence to PPP
still comes from data sets that employ at least some fixed-rate data. Perhaps by
the time of the next Handbook, there will be more years of floating-rate data from
more countries and perhaps, if these are combined with more powerful economet-
ric techniques, we will have a clearer picture of whether and how fast exchange
rates converge to PPP under floating rates.
39There has also been a considerable amount ofprogress in recent years in ana-
lyzing the effect of productivity and government spending shocks on real exchange
rates. Most of the empirical literature, however, does not explicitly take dynam-
ics into account. As we have seen in the simple PPP literature, dynamics can be
quite central, so further progress on understanding the dynamic effects of various
real shocks might potentiallyprove fruitful.
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